

Creating a mac_apt Plugin (Part 2)

In IIR Vol.54, we took a look at the demo plugin provided by the mac_apt forensic analysis framework for macOS to understand the basic structure of mac_apt plugins^{*1}. In this installment, I discuss the data stored in “~/Library/Caches/<Application Bundle ID>/Cache.db” and go over the implementation of a mac_apt plugin for analyzing this artifact. If you haven’t read the article in IIR Vol.54 yet, you may find it easier to follow along if you go back and read that first.

2.1 What Information Does Cache.db Hold?

First, we look at the information recorded in Cache.db. This is a cache of HTTP/HTTPS data transfers made via APIs like NSURLRequest. The Cache.db file is an SQLite-format database and holds the data in the database tables shown in Tables 1–5. The cache data is basically stored in this database, but data above a certain size is stored as a file in the fsCacheData directory (Figure 1). This is apparently called the “CFURL Cache”, because the database table name starts with “cfurl_cache”.

Column	Data type
entry_ID	The entry ID
response_object	BLOB in plist format. Holds the URL accessed, HTTP status, response header, etc.
request_object	BLOB in plist format. Holds the URL accessed, access method, request header, etc.
proto_props	Unknown (used for cache control?)
user_info	Unknown (all NULL to the extent this author has checked)

Table 1: cfurl_cache_blob_data

Column	Data type
entry_ID	The entry ID
isDataOnFS	Flag indicating the format of the response data from the server 0: Response body from the server is stored in receiver_data. 1: Response body from the server is stored in a file.
receiver_data	Holds the response data from the server (isDataOnFS = 0) or the name of the file in which it has been stored (isDataOnFS = 1). The file is saved in “~/Library/Caches/<App Bundle ID>/fsCacheData”. File names are in UUID format.

Table 2: cfurl_cache_receiver_data

Column	Data type
entry_ID	The entry ID
version	Unknown (all 0 to the extent this author has checked)
hash_value	Unknown
storage_policy	Unknown (all 0 to the extent this author has checked)
request_key	URL of the destination accessed
time_stamp	Timestamp of when the URL was accessed
partition	Unknown (all NULL to the extent this author has checked)

Table 3: cfurl_cache_response

Column	Data type
schema_version	The schema version (all 202 to the extent this author has checked, except in cases where the table itself does not exist)

Table 4: cfurl_cache_schema_version

Column	Data type
cfurl_cache_response	Maximum value for entry_ID of cfurl_cache_response?

Table 5: sqlite_sequence

*1 Focused Research (1) in Internet Infrastructure Review (IIR) Vol.54, “Creating a mac_apt Plugin (Part 1)” (<https://www.ij.ad.jp/en/dev/iir/054.html>).

Looking at this information, you can check not only the date and time of program data transfers and the destination URLs but also the responses received from the servers. User and program activity histories are crucial to forensic analysis, so this artifact is a very useful source of information.

2.2 Designing a Plugin

2.2.1 Data to Acquire

Before we get into creating the plugin, let's look a little closer at what information we can get from the artifact.

Tables 1–3 indicate we can obtain the data transfer timestamp, the destination URL, the client's request method and header, the server's HTTP status and response body,

and the response body from the server. The data in these tables are linked by a key called entry_ID. And the "<Application Bundle ID>" part of the file path to where Cache.db is stored identifies the program that made the transfer. We need the plugin to collect this information and save it as an analysis result.

Note that the response_object and request_object in the cfurl_cache_blob_data table (Table 1) are stored as plist-format BLOBs (Figure 2)*2. This data should not be left in plist format when stored in the analysis results. Instead, it should be parsed to make it easy for the analyst to determine the contents.

```
% ls -alR ~/Library/Caches/com.apple.osascript
total 128
drwxr-xr-x  4 macforensics  staff   128  2 10 17:36 .
drwx-----+ 150 macforensics  staff  4800  4 27 15:12 ..
-rw-r--r--@  1 macforensics  staff  65536  5 19 2021 Cache.db
drwxr-xr-x@  4 macforensics  staff   128  2  2 2021 fsCachedData

/Users/macforensics/Library/Caches/com.apple.osascript/fsCachedData:
total 344
drwxr-xr-x@ 4 macforensics  staff   128  2  2 2021 .
drwxr-xr-x  4 macforensics  staff   128  2 10 17:36 ..
-rw-r--r--@ 1 macforensics  staff 116503 11  9 2020 2B1680C0-DAE0-4EA0-9EC0-C4FC7F86A8C0
-rw-r--r--@ 1 macforensics  staff  53755  2  2 2021 A391D5EC-9FCF-4993-A0AF-EEF2C871EF6A
```

Figure 1: File Structure

The screenshot shows a forensic analysis tool interface. On the left, a table displays cache entries with columns for entry_ID, response_object, request_object, proto_props, and user_info. Entry 3 is highlighted. On the right, a hex dump view shows the raw data of the response object, starting with the magic number 'bplist00'.

entry_ID	response_object	request_object	proto_props	user_info
1	BLOB	BLOB	BLOB	NULL
2	BLOB	BLOB	BLOB	NULL
3	BLOB	BLOB	BLOB	NULL

```
0000 62 70 6c 69 73 74 30 30 d2 01 02 03 04 57 56 66 bplist00....WVe
0010 72 73 69 6f 6e 65 41 72 72 61 79 10 01 a7 05 0a rsionUArray....
0020 0b 0c 0d 40 41 d2 06 07 08 09 5f 10 10 5f 43 46 ...@A....._CP
0030 55 52 4c 53 74 72 69 6e 67 54 79 70 65 5e 5f 43 URLStringType\C
0040 46 55 52 4c 53 74 72 69 6e 67 10 0f 5f 10 49 68 FURLString...Th
0050 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 72 61 77 2e 67 69 74 68 75 ttps://raw.githu
0060 62 75 73 65 72 63 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2e 63 6f 6d busercontent.com
0070 2f 69 74 73 2d 61 2d 66 65 61 74 75 72 65 2f 4f /its-a-feature/O
0080 72 63 68 61 72 64 2f 6d 61 73 74 65 72 2f 4f 72 rchard/master/O
0090 63 68 61 72 64 2e 6a 73 23 41 c2 e4 99 3f 65 80 rchard.js#A...?e.
00a0 99 10 00 10 c8 df 10 19 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 18 .....!#$%
00b0 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 26 &()*+.../012345
00c0 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 36 6789; <=>?_.. Con
00d0 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 5f 10 10 43 6f 6e tent-Encodng...
00e0 74 65 6e 74 2d 45 6e 63 6f 64 69 6e 67 5f 10 17 Content-Security
00f0 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 -Policy]Cache-Co
0100 2d 50 6f 6e 69 63 79 5d 43 61 63 68 65 2d 43 6f ntrol...Strict-T
0110 6e 74 72 6f 6e 5f 10 19 53 74 72 69 63 74 2d 54 ransport-Securit
0120 72 61 6e 73 70 6f 72 74 2d 53 65 63 75 72 69 74
```

Figure 2: Sample response_object

*2 The "bplist00" sequence at the start is the plist binary format's magic number.

Figure 3 shows the result of exporting the request_object data using DB Browser for SQLite^{*3} or other software, parsing it with plutil, the standard macOS command. It looks like the data we need for forensic analysis is

```
% plutil -p cfurl_cache_blob_data__request_object_2.bin
{
  "Array" => [
    0 => 0
    1 => {
      "_CFURLString" => "https://www.example.com/"
      "_CFURLStringType" => 15
    }
    2 => 60
    3 => 1
    4 => "__CFURLRequestNullTokenString__"
    5 => 1
    6 => 134
    7 => "__CFURLRequestNullTokenString__"
    8 => "__CFURLRequestNullTokenString__"
    9 => 1
    10 => 0
    11 => 0
    12 => 0
    13 => 0
    14 => 0
    15 => -1
    16 => "__CFURLRequestNullTokenString__"
    17 => 2
    18 => "GET"
    19 => {
      "_hhaa__" => "
YnBsaXN0MDDTAQIDBAYIXxAPQWNjZXB0LUVuY29kaW5nVkJyY2VwdF8QD0FjY2VwdC1
MYW5ndWFnZaEFXxARZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZSwgYnKhB1MqLyqhCVVqYS1qcAgPISg6PF
BSVlgAAAAAAAAABAQAAAAAAAAAKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAXg=="
      "Accept" => "*/*"
      "Accept-Encoding" => "gzip, deflate, br"
      "Accept-Language" => "ja-jp"
    }
    20 => "__CFURLRequestNullTokenString__"
    21 => "__CFURLRequestNullTokenString__"
  ]
  "Version" => 9
}
```

Figure 3: Result of Parsing the request_object Data

```
% echo
YnBsaXN0MDDTAQIDBAYIXxAPQWNjZXB0LUVuY29kaW5nVkJyY2VwdF8QD0FjY2VwdC1
MYW5ndWFnZaEFXxARZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZSwgYnKhB1MqLyqhCVVqYS1qcAgPISg6PF
BSVlgAAAAAAAAABAQAAAAAAAAAKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAXg== | base64 -d |
plutil -p -
{
  "Accept" => [
    0 => "*/*"
  ]
  "Accept-Encoding" => [
    0 => "gzip, deflate, br"
  ]
  "Accept-Language" => [
    0 => "ja-jp"
  ]
}
```

Figure 4: Result of Parsing the request_object's __hhaa__ Field

contained in elements 18 and 19 of the Array. Element 18 is the HTTP request method, and 19 is the HTTP request header.

Element 19 also holds Base64-encoded data in its “__hhaa__” field. This is a plist in binary format; Figure 4 shows the decoded content. It is the same as the HTTP request header and thus we can conclude that it does not need to be included in the analysis results. The response_object data can also be examined in the same manner (Figure 5). In this case, element 3 of the Array holds the HTTP status and element 4 holds the HTTP response header.

```
% plutil -p cfurl_cache_blob_data__response_object_2.bin
{
  "Array" => [
    0 => {
      "_CFURLString" => "https://www.example.com/"
      "_CFURLStringType" => 15
    }
    1 => 628074307.809312
    2 => 0
    3 => 200
    4 => {
      "_hhaa__" => "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"
      "Accept-Ranges" => "bytes"
      "Age" => "568797"
      "Cache-Control" => "max-age=604800"
      "Content-Encoding" => "gzip"
      "Content-Length" => "648"
      "Content-Type" => "text/html; charset=UTF-8"
      "Date" => "Thu, 26 Nov 2020 09:05:07 GMT"
      "Etag" => ""3147526947""
      "Expires" => "Thu, 03 Dec 2020 09:05:07 GMT"
      "Last-Modified" => "Thu, 17 Oct 2019 07:18:26 GMT"
      "Server" => "ECS (nyb/1D2F)"
      "Vary" => "Accept-Encoding"
      "X-Cache" => "HIT"
    }
    5 => 1256
    6 => "text/html"
  ]
  "Version" => 1
}
```

Figure 5: Result of Parsing the response_object Data

*3 DB Browser for SQLite (<https://sqlitebrowser.org/>).

The `receiver_data` field in the `cfurl_cache_receiver_data` table (Table 2) holds the response body received from the server. This information is also useful for forensic analysis, so we save it in the analysis results. But rather than including the data in the analysis results in the form of a file saved in the `fsCacheData` directory, we should instead export the file. This avoids unnecessarily increasing the analysis results file size.

2.2.2 Data Acquisition Method

Next, we consider how to go about acquiring the data. Since `Cache.db` is a SQLite database, information can be retrieved using SQL queries. Given the results above, we can use the SQL query in Figure 6 to obtain the required information.

The plist data stored in the `response_object` and `request_object` can be parsed using the Python `plistlib` module^{*4}. `__hhaa__` is excluded from the parse result.

2.2.3 Plugin Implementation Approach

At this point, we have determined what data to obtain and how to acquire it, and based on this, we can lay out an implementation approach for the plugin as shown below.

1. Process a macOS disk image or exported artifacts.
 - 1.1 If processing a disk image, process all artifacts in all users' `~/Library/Caches/` directories.
 - 1.2 If processing exported artifacts, process all artifacts in the specified directory.
2. Save the following data in the analysis results.
 - 2.1 Data obtained via the SQL query in Figure 6
 - 2.2 Results of parsing `response_object` and `request_object`
 - 2.3 Application Bundle ID
 - 2.4 In the case of disk images, export the files in the `fsCacheData` directory

```
SELECT entry_ID, time_stamp, request_key, request_object, response_object, isDataOnFS, receiver_data
FROM cfurl_cache_response JOIN cfurl_cache_blob_data USING (entry_ID)
JOIN cfurl_cache_receiver_data USING (entry_ID)
```

Figure 6: SQL Query for Obtaining the Required Data from `Cache.db`

*4 You can also use the `CommonFunctions.ReadPlist()` method provided by `mac_apt`.

2.3 Creating the Plugin

Now let's start creating the plugin. The plugin discussed here was merged via a Pull Request in July 2021, so you can find it on the `mac_apt` GitHub repository⁵.

Here, I give an outline of what the plugin does. Please refer to the source code for further details if necessary⁶.

2.3.1 Properties

I set the properties as shown in Figure 7. The plugin is called `CFURLCACHE`. As it processes disk images and exported artifacts, it uses `__Plugin_Modes = "MACOS,ARTIFACTONLY"`.

2.3.2 Entry Points

■ `Plugin_Start()`

`Plugin_Start()` is the plugin entry point when you run `mac_apt.py` (Figure 8).

`mac_info.users` holds a list object containing the user information on the disk image. You can use this to loop through and process the artifacts for all users (line 179). But since the same home directory can be configured for use on multiple accounts, the plugin skips home directories that have already been processed (lines 180–182).

```
__Plugin_Name = "CFURLCACHE" # Cannot have spaces, and must be all caps!
__Plugin_Friendly_Name = "CFURL cache"
__Plugin_Version = "1.0"
__Plugin_Description = "Parses CFURL cache and extract date, URL, request, response, and received data."
__Plugin_Author = "Minoru Kobayashi"
__Plugin_Author_Email = "unknownbit@gmail.com"

__Plugin_Modes = "MACOS,ARTIFACTONLY" # Valid values are 'MACOS', 'IOS', 'ARTIFACTONLY'
__Plugin_ArtifactOnly_Usage = 'Provide the path to "/Library/Cache/" folder under user home'
```

Figure 7: Properties

```
173 def Plugin_Start(mac_info):
174     '''Main Entry point function for plugin'''
175     cfurl_cache_artifacts = []
176     cfurl_cache_base_path = '{}/Library/Caches/'
177     processed_paths = set()
178
179     for user in mac_info.users:
180         if user.home_dir in processed_paths:
181             continue # Avoid processing same folder twice (some users have same folder! (Eg: root & daemon))
182         processed_paths.add(user.home_dir)
183         base_path = cfurl_cache_base_path.format(user.home_dir)
184         if not mac_info.IsValidFolderPath(base_path):
185             continue
186         cache_folder_list = mac_info.ListItemsInFolder(base_path, EntryType.FOLDERS, include_dates=False)
187         app_bundle_ids = [folder_item['name'] for folder_item in cache_folder_list]
188         for app_bundle_id in app_bundle_ids:
189             cache_folder_path = os.path.join(cfurl_cache_base_path.format(user.home_dir), app_bundle_id)
190             cache_db_path = os.path.join(cache_folder_path, 'Cache.db')
191             if mac_info.IsValidFilePath(cache_db_path) and mac_info.GetFileSize(cache_db_path) > 0:
192                 ExtractAndReadCFURLCache(mac_info, cfurl_cache_artifacts, user.user_name, app_bundle_id, cache_folder_path)
193
194     if len(cfurl_cache_artifacts) > 0:
195         PrintAll(cfurl_cache_artifacts, mac_info.output_params, '')
196     else:
197         log.info('No CFURL cache artifacts were found!')
```

Figure 8: The `Plugin_Start()` Function

⁵ `cfurl_cache.py` (https://github.com/ydkhatri/mac_apt/blob/3e823ee36bdf133c4de3503848435033ee20943d/plugins/cfurl_cache.py).

⁶ Note that, if the plugin has been updated since this writing, line numbers in this article may not correspond to those in the current source code.

For unprocessed home directories, the `mac_info` object's `IsValidFolderPath()` method is used to check for the existence of the home directory in the disk image (line 184), and the `ListItemsInFolder()` method is used to create a list of directories in `"~/Library/Caches/"` (line 186).

The `IsValidFilePath()` method is then used to check for the existence of `Cache.db` files in each of the directories (line 191). If the file exists, the `ExtractAndReadCFURLCache()` function is called to obtain analysis results for `Cache.db` and export the artifact file (line 192). The analysis results are stored in `cfurl_cache_artifacts` as a list object.

Once all of the `Cache.db` files have been analyzed, the results are stored using the `PrintAll()` function (line 195).

■ Plugin_Start_Standalone()

`Plugin_Start_Standalone()` is the plugin entry point when you run `mac_apt_artifact_only.py` (Figure 9).

`input_files_list` contains the name of the directory to be processed as specified on the command line (line 202). Beyond that, the function basically runs through the same process as `Plugin_Start()`, but with this entry point, the `OpenAndReadCFURLCache()` function is called to perform the analysis instead of the `ExtractAndReadCFURLCache()` function (line 212).

2.3.3 Data Analysis

■ ExtractAndReadCFURLCache()

This function opens a `Cache.db` file in the disk image, analyzes the data, saves the analysis results, and exports the artifact file (Figure 10).

`Cache.db` is opened inside the `OpenDbFromImage()` function (line 147). This function uses the `connect()` method of the `SqliteWrapper` class provided by `mac_apt` to get a connection to the SQLite database. As this class is a wrapper around the standard Python `sqlite3`

```

199 def Plugin_Start_Standalone(input_files_list, output_params):
200     '''Main entry point function when used on single artifacts (mac_apt_singleplugin), not on a full disk image'''
201     log.info("Module Started as standalone")
202     for input_path in input_files_list:
203         log.debug("Input file passed was: " + input_path)
204         cfurl_cache_artifacts = []
205         if os.path.isdir(input_path):
206             cache_folder_list = os.listdir(input_path)
207             app_bundle_ids = [f for f in cache_folder_list if os.path.isdir(os.path.join(input_path, f))]
208             for app_bundle_id in app_bundle_ids:
209                 cache_folder_path = os.path.join(input_path, app_bundle_id)
210                 cache_db_path = os.path.join(cache_folder_path, 'Cache.db')
211                 if os.path.isfile(cache_db_path) and os.path.getsize(cache_db_path) > 0:
212                     OpenAndReadCFURLCache(cfurl_cache_artifacts, '', app_bundle_id, cache_folder_path)
213
214             if len(cfurl_cache_artifacts) > 0:
215                 PrintAll(cfurl_cache_artifacts, output_params, input_path)
216             else:
217                 log.info('No CFURL cache artifacts were found!')

```

Figure 9: The `Plugin_Start_Standalone()` Function

```

145 def ExtractAndReadCFURLCache(mac_info, cfurl_cache_artifacts, username, app_bundle_id, folder_path):
146     cfurl_cache_db_path = os.path.join(folder_path, 'Cache.db')
147     db, wrapper = OpenDbFromImage(mac_info, cfurl_cache_db_path, username)
148     if db:
149         ParseCFURLEntry(db, cfurl_cache_artifacts, username, app_bundle_id, cfurl_cache_db_path)
150         mac_info.ExportFolder(folder_path, os.path.join(__Plugin_Name, username), True)
151         db.close()

```

Figure 10: The `ExtractAndReadCFURLCache()` Function

module, you can use sqlite3 methods to execute SQL queries and so forth.

The data analysis happens not in the `ExtractAndReadCFURLCache()` function but in the `ParseCFURLEntry()` function. It is set up this way so that both `ExtractAndReadCFURLCache()` and `OpenAndReadCFURLCache()`, described below, can use the same processing routine (line 149).

Finally, the `ExportFolder()` method is used to export the artifact file (line 150). The first argument is the folder path to export from, the second is the name of the export destination folder, and the third is the overwrite flag.

The export destination folder specified by the second argument is created in the “Export” folder that is created within the output destination folder specified on the `mac_apt` command line. A look at the source code of other plugins shows that they basically use “`__Plugin_Name`” for this. But with CFURL Cache, because there is an artifact file for each user, the user name is also included in the export destination folder name.

■ `OpenAndReadCFURLCache()`

This function opens the exported `Cache.db` file, analyzes the data, and saves the analysis results (Figure 11). It does not export artifact files.

`Cache.db` is opened inside the `OpenDb()` function. This function gets a connection using the `mac_apt` `CommonFunctions` class’s `open_sqlite_db_readonly()` method. Data analysis is done by the `ParseCFURLEntry()` function, as noted above.

■ `ParseCFURLEntry()`

This function issues a SQL query and retrieves the required data from `Cache.db` (Figure 12). It also parses the acquired data and saves the analysis results.

First, it gets a list of table names, and if a `cfurl_cache_schema_version` table exists, it gets the schema version (lines 118–121). To the extent I have checked, only version 202 is ever used*7.

Next, it uses the SQL query in Figure 6 to get the required data (lines 125–128). As mentioned above, the `request_object` and `response_object` data are in a binary-format

```
153 def OpenAndReadCFURLCache(cfurl_cache_artifacts, username, app_bundle_id, folder_path): ←
154     cfurl_cache_db_path = os.path.join(folder_path, 'Cache.db') ←
155     db = OpenDb(cfurl_cache_db_path) ←
156     if db: ←
157         ParseCFURLEntry(db, cfurl_cache_artifacts, 'N/A', app_bundle_id, cfurl_cache_db_path) ←
158     db.close() ←
```

Figure 11: The `OpenAndReadCFURLCache()` Function

*7 In some cases, depending on the macOS version, there is no `cfurl_cache_schema_version` table present.

plist. The data are analyzed by the ParseRequestObject() and ParseResponseObject() functions described below (lines 130–131).

The receiver_data object type depends on what it holds. If it holds the response body, it will be “bytes”. If it holds the name of the file (UUID) in the fsCacheData directory, it will be “str” (lines 132–135).

Finally, it saves the acquired data as an entry in the analysis results (lines 140–143). The plugin defines the CfurlCacheItem class to hold analysis results (Figure 13), and the entry is an instance of that class. The class has no methods; it is simply there to group the data together.

```
114 def ParseCFURLEntry(db, cfurl_cache_artifacts, username, app_bundle_id, cfurl_cache_db_path):
115     db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
116     tables = CommonFunctions.GetTableNames(db)
117     schema_version = 0
118     if 'cfurl_cache_schema_version' in tables:
119         schema_version = CheckSchemaVersion(db)
120     else:
121         log.debug('There is no cfurl_cache_schema_version table.')
122
123     if 'cfurl_cache_response' in tables:
124         if schema_version in (0, 202):
125             query = """SELECT entry_ID, time_stamp, request_key, request_object, response_object, isDataOnFS, receiver_data
126                 FROM cfurl_cache_response JOIN cfurl_cache_blob_data USING (entry_ID)
127                 JOIN cfurl_cache_receiver_data USING (entry_ID)"""
128             cursor = db.execute(query)
129             for row in cursor:
130                 http_req_method, req_headers = ParseRequestObject(row['request_object'])
131                 http_status, resp_headers = ParseResponseObject(row['response_object'])
132                 if type(row['receiver_data']) == bytes:
133                     received_data = row['receiver_data']
134                 elif type(row['receiver_data']) == str:
135                     received_data = row['receiver_data'].encode()
136                 else:
137                     log.error('Unknown type of "receiver_data": {}'.format(type(row['receiver_data'])))
138                     continue
139
140                 item = CfurlCacheItem(row['time_stamp'], row['request_key'], http_req_method, req_headers,
141                                     http_status, resp_headers, row['isDataOnFS'], received_data,
142                                     username, app_bundle_id, cfurl_cache_db_path)
143                 cfurl_cache_artifacts.append(item)
```

Figure 12: The ParseCFURLEntry() Function

```
41 class CfurlCacheItem:
42     def __init__(self, date, url, method, req_header, http_status, resp_header, isDataOnFS, received_data, username, app_bundle_id, source):
43         self.date = date
44         self.url = url
45         self.method = method
46         self.req_header = req_header
47         self.http_status = http_status
48         self.resp_header = resp_header
49         self.isDataOnFS = isDataOnFS
50         self.received_data = received_data
51         self.username = username
52         self.app_bundle_id = app_bundle_id
53         self.source = source
```

Figure 13: Class that Holds Analysis Results

ParseRequestObject() and ParseResponseObject()

This function gets data from the request_object and response_object (Figure 14, Figure 15).

As noted above, the request_object array's 18th element holds the HTTP method, and the 19th holds the HTTP request header (lines 96–97 in Figure 14). We also exclude the __hhaa__ field (line 100 in Figure 14). Similarly, the response_object array's 3rd element is the HTTP status, and the 4th is the HTTP response header (lines 106–107 in Figure 15).

2.3.4 Saving the Analysis Results

PrintAll()

This function saves the analysis results in the format specified on the command line (Figure 16). cfurl_cache_info

defines the column names and types used when storing the analysis results (lines 162–164). The analysis data items are collected into a list object in the same order as the items in the cfurl_cache_info definition, and in the final step, the WriteList() function writes the data to a file (lines 168–171).

2.4 Example of the Plugin in Action

Figure 17 shows the analysis results from the plugin discussed here (columns to the right of Received_Data have been trimmed from the screenshot). I hope you'll agree that it is easy to examine the data once the information is organized like this.

```

94 def ParseRequestObject(object_data):-
95     object_array = plistlib.loads(object_data)['Array']
96     http_req_method = object_array[18]
97     header_list = object_array[19]
98     req_headers = []
99     for header, value in header_list.items():
100         if header != '__hhaa__':
101             req_headers.append("{}: {}".format(header, value))
102     return http_req_method, "\r\n".join(req_headers)

```

Figure 14: The ParseRequestObject() Function

```

104 def ParseResponseObject(object_data):-
105     object_array = plistlib.loads(object_data)['Array']
106     http_status = object_array[3]
107     header_list = object_array[4]
108     resp_headers = []
109     for header, value in header_list.items():
110         if header != '__hhaa__':
111             resp_headers.append("{}: {}".format(header, value))
112     return http_status, "\r\n".join(resp_headers)

```

Figure 15: The ParseResponseObject() Function

```

161 def PrintAll(cfurl_cache_artifacts, output_params, source_path):-
162     cfurl_cache_info = [('Date', DataType.TEXT), ('URL', DataType.TEXT), ('Method', DataType.TEXT), ('Request_Header', DataType.TEXT),
163                        ('HTTP_Status', DataType.TEXT), ('Response_Header', DataType.TEXT), ('isDataOnFS', DataType.INTEGER), ('Received_Data', DataType.BLOB),
164                        ('User', DataType.TEXT), ('App_Bundle_ID', DataType.TEXT), ('Source', DataType.TEXT)]
165
166     data_list = []
167     log.info("{} CFURL cache artifact(s) found".format(len(cfurl_cache_artifacts)))
168     for item in cfurl_cache_artifacts:
169         data_list.append([item.date, item.url, item.method, item.req_header, item.http_status, item.resp_header, item.isDataOnFS, item.received_data, item.username, item.app_bundle_id, item.source])
170
171     WriteList("CFURL cache", "CFURL_Cache", data_list, cfurl_cache_info, output_params, source_path)

```

Figure 16: The PrintAll() Function

	Date	URL	Method	Request_Header	HTTP_Status	Response_Header	isDataOnFS	Received_Data
	フィルター	フィルター	フィルター	フィルター	フィルター	フィルター	フィルター	フィルター
1	2020-11-09 01:58:45	https://stackoverflow.com/	GET	Accept: */*	200	Content-Encoding: gzip...	1	2B1680C0-DAE0-4EA0-9EC0-C4FC7F86A8C0
2	2020-11-09 02:10:43	https://www.example.com/	GET	Accept: */*	200	Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8...	0	<!doctype html>...
3	2021-02-02 06:58:03	https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lts-a-feature/Orchard/master/Orchard.js	GET	Accept: */*	200	Content-Encoding: gzip...	1	A391D5EC-9FCF-4993-A0AF-EEF2C871E66A

Figure 17: Analysis Results from the Plugin

2.5 Conclusion

This two-part series has walked through the creation of a `mac_apt` plugin. While I have provided a broad understanding of plugin structure and process flow, I certainly have not covered all of the APIs `mac_apt` provides. Looking at other plugins also would be a great way to further your understanding.

`mac_apt` is a powerful forensic analysis tool, but the best way to get support for more artifacts is to write your own plugins. As explained in the previous installment, many artifacts are in plist or SQLite format, so it's very easy to look through the data, and the most important advantage

is that you can analyze the data you require for your purposes in the format of your choice.

Finally, some readers may be more interested in how to go about reading and making sense of the `mac_apt` analysis results than in creating plugins. I would recommend the presentation slides^{*8} and analysis data^{*9} from the macOS hands-on forensics workshop given at the Japan Security Analyst Conference 2022 (JSAC2022) as a useful reference in this case. The workshop used `mac_apt` analysis results to create a forensic timeline of malware incursion. A video of the workshop is also available^{*10}.



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*8 Workshop slides (https://jsac.jpCERT.or.jp/archive/2022/pdf/JSAC2022_workshop_macOS-forensic_en.pdf).

*9 Analysis data (https://jsac.jpCERT.or.jp/archive/2022/data/JSAC2022_macos_forensic_workshop_without_malware.7z).

*10 [JSAC2022] Workshop: An Introduction to macOS Forensics with Open Source Software (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mor9EplnrXM>).